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Bernard Williams and the Basic Legitimation
Demand: A Defence
Edward Hall
London School of Economics and Political Science
In this article I discuss Bernard Williams’ realist conception of legitimacy. According to his critics Williams tacitly
incorporates various moral claims, endorses a philosophically suspect ‘consensus’ view of politics, and employs an
unrealistic and moralised conception of political rule. I argue that these criticisms mischaracterise the nature of the
basic legitimation demand and the judgements about the acceptability of the state at its core and conclude that political
theorists who object to the direction and style of much contemporary political theory should take seriously the
possibility of developing an appropriately ‘political’ political theory on Williamsian lines.
Keywords: Bernard Williams; basic legitimation demand; political realism; political
moralism
A number of thinkers concerned by the style of much contemporary political theory have
recently attacked the suggestion that political theory is a branch of applied ethics and
gestured towards the possibility of developing a more self-consciously realist approach.
Chief among these is Bernard Williams, whose posthumous political essays have been
influential in setting the agenda of the burgeoning realist movement in political theory.1
The basic legitimation demand (BLD) is central to Williams’ realism because he claims it
offers a distinctively political standard of evaluation that avoids the moralism of much
contemporary political theory.However, commentators have recently disputed this claim by
arguing that Williams tacitly incorporates moral claims, which precludes him from offering
a realist alternative to political moralism, commits to a philosophically suspect consensus
view of politics and endorses an unrealistic and moralised conception of politics itself.
Hence, one critic concludes that Williams’ realism ‘shares significant features with liberal
theory ...which means that it is vulnerable to the same critique that other realists have made
of liberalism’ (Sleat, 2010, p. 486) while another insists that it offers an ‘unfeasible return to
an ideal-type expectation’ (Freeden, 2012, p. 6).
In this article I focus on four influential criticisms because by engaging with Williams’
critics we can better appreciate the attractions of thinking about politics in the terms he
encourages. I argue that Williams’ critics mischaracterise the nature of the BLD and the
judgements about the acceptability of the state at its core, and conclude that political
theorists who are uneasy with the moralism of much contemporary political theory should
re-evaluate the attractions of thinking about politics in Williams’ terms.
The First Political Question
Williams claims that two forms of political moralism (PM) dominate political philosophy.
Enactment models, like utilitarianism, formulate ‘principles, concepts, ideals, and values’ and
seek to ‘express these in political action’, while structural models, like those of Rawls, spell
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out the ‘moral conditions of co-existence under power’. Despite their differences both
models see political philosophy as a form of applied morality and accordingly represent the
‘priority of the moral over the political’ (Williams, 2005, p. 2). In contrast Williams (2005, p.
3) pursues a political realism that gives ‘a greater autonomy to distinctively political thought’.
This is not Realpolitik. Rather,Williams argues that the normative standards employed in
politics must be sensitive to the relationship between political practice and moral principle
and that political philosophy should consequently ‘use distinctively political concepts, such as
power, and its normative relative, legitimation’ (Williams, 2005, p. 77).
He identifies the first political question – first because solving it ‘is the condition of
solving, indeed posing, any others’ – with the securing of ‘order, protection, safety, trust, and
the conditions of cooperation’ (Williams, 2005, p. 3).2 It is a necessary condition of
legitimacy (LEG) that the state solve this question, but unlike Hobbes,Williams insists that
it is not sufficient because the point of politics is to save people from terror which he
recognises states can also inflict. Any purported solution is subject to a basic legitimation
demand (BLD) which is equated with the idea that it is an acceptable answer because:
if the power of one lot of people over another is to represent a solution to the first political
question, and not itself be part of the problem, something has to be said to explain ... what the
difference is between the solution and the problem, and that cannot simply be an account of
successful domination. It has to be a mode of justifying explanation or legitimation (Williams,
2005, p. 5, emphasis in original).
Hence, the need for a justification of political power arises when ‘A coerces B and claims
that B would be wrong to fight back: resents it, forbids it, rallies others to oppose it as
wrong’, because by doing this,‘A claims that his actions transcend the conditions of warfare,
and this gives rise to a demand of justification of what A does’ (Williams, 2005, p. 6).
Williams insists that the BLD does not represent a morality that is prior to politics as ‘it
is a claim that is inherent in there being such a thing as politics ... because it is inherent in
there being a first political question’ (Williams, 2005, p. 5). For this reason, legitimacy and
other political virtues are ‘different ideas’ and there ‘manifestly have been, and perhaps are,
LEG non-liberal states’ (Williams, 2005, p. 4), because ‘a given historical structure can be ...
an example of the human capacity to live under an intelligible order of authority. It makes
sense to us as such a structure’ (Williams, 2005, p. 10, emphasis in original). The crux of
Williams’ view is that political rule claims authority while brute force is mere coercion,
with the important proviso that for political authority to be experienced as such the
legitimation story must make sense (MS) to those citizens who are subjected to the coercive
power of the state.This is why he insists that ‘one thing can be taken as an axiom, that might
does not imply right, that ... the power of coercion offered simply as the power of coercion
cannot justify its own use’ (Williams, 2005, pp. 5–6). He asks us to consider a radically
disadvantaged group of subjects who ‘are no better off than enemies of the state’ (he uses the
historical example of the Helot population of Sparta who were openly treated as enemies
by their rulers). In such scenarios we do not have ‘per se a political situation’ because ‘the
mere circumstance of some subjects being de facto in the power of others is no legitimation
of their being radically disadvantaged’, as there ‘is nothing to be said to this group to explain
why they shouldn’t revolt’ (Williams, 2005, p. 5).
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Williams notes that we cannot precisely pinpoint when a genuine need for justification
arises; it is not a sufficient condition that someone demands one ‘because anyone who feels
he has grievance can raise a demand, and there is always some place for grievance’, but ‘it
is also not a necessary condition, because people can be drilled by coercive power into
accepting its exercise’ (Williams, 2005, p. 6). I return to the former point when discussing
the ‘consensus’ critique of the BLD.The latter point introduces Williams’ ‘critical theory
principle’ (CTP), which holds that if the disadvantaged in a society accept a justification of
power purely as a result of the exercise of power itself, the fact that they accept the story
does not legitimate it.3
By focusing on the primacy of securing order Williams rejects ‘the basic relation of
morality to politics as being that represented either by the enactment model or by the
structural model’ (Williams, 2005, p. 8, emphasis in original). Political moralism pays
insufficient attention to the centrality of answering the first question in realistic terms and,
more often than not, forgets the contextual and historically conditioned nature of judge-
ments about what makes sense.Williams insists that:
inasmuch as liberalism has foundations, it has foundations in its capacity to answer the ‘first
question’ in what is now seen, granted these answers to the BLD, as an acceptable way ... but
this is not the foundation of the liberal state, because it is a product of those same forces that
lead to a situation in which the BLD is satisfied only by a liberal state (Williams, 2005, p. 8).
He puts this most schematically when he writes that LEG + Modernity = Liberalism.
‘Now and around here’ we only permit liberal solutions because ‘other supposed legitima-
tions are now seen to be false and in particular ideological’ (Williams, 2005, p. 8).This is
markedly different from claiming that liberalism is the political expression of a set of
timeless moral truths or that all previous legitimation stories were false.Williams accuses
PM of forgetting this because it has an implausible understanding of ethics as a ‘mere moral
normativity’, the result of the exercise of ahistorical reasoning. He holds that such views
lack a theory of error that can explain ‘why what it takes to be the true moral solution to
the questions of politics, liberalism, should for the first time (roughly) become evident in
European culture from the seventeenth century onward, and why these truths have been
concealed from other people’ (Williams, 2005, p. 9).4 Any fleshing out of what makes sense
must be inherently local as it must satisfy the subjects to whom it applies in ways that will,
in actuality and not merely in philosophical theory, ring true in the historical context in
which they are made.5 When we ask what makes sense we consequently ‘need concepts and
explanations which are rooted in our more local practices, our culture, and our history’
(Williams, 2006, pp. 186–7).
As answering the first political question is a matter of practical concern, legitimacy is not
an abstract moral ideal but a live contextual possibility or, to put it another way, a reachable
threshold. In contrast, political moralism tends to make very demanding claims of legiti-
macy. To employ a famous example, A. J. Simmons argues that a legitimate state must
actually be consented to in quasi-Lockean terms, because of the ‘voluntarism’ that derives
from his rights-based view, and infers that no existent states are legitimate.6 From the
perspective Williams advocates this gets things the wrong way round. Rather than begin-
ning with an antecedent moral view that is applied to politics, he begins by looking at the
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existent character of political rule and asks if we can extract an internal ethic from it, hence
his suggestion that the BLD ‘is implicit in the very idea of a legitimate state, and so is
inherent in any politics’ (Williams, 2005,p.8). The basic idea is that politics contains its own
internal legitimatising ‘ethic’ because the state demands a particular kind of allegiance from
those agents it claims to incorporate as political subjects. Political moralism mistakes the
contextual judgements about what makes sense with the basic conditions of satisfying the
BLD. When the BLD is answered – which is to say, when the legitimation story is accepted
in the relevant way (I discuss what this involves shortly) – rulers exercise political authority
because they do not merely coerce or subordinate their subjects but act in a politically
intelligible manner, and accordingly can be said to stand in a political relationship with their
subjects in the way that, for example, a warlord does not.7
Mark Philp captures the underlying conception of politics at work when he writes that
politics ‘involves at least some claim to authority ... [while] brute force determines outcomes
but it does so coercively, not authoritatively’, and it is therefore ‘integral to political rule to
invoke at least some claim to authority and thereby to legitimacy ... which implies some
recognition of this on the part of citizens’ (Philp, 2007, pp. 55–6). This is an avowedly
internalist conception of legitimacy, in the spirit of Hume and Weber, which holds that the
conditions of legitimacy do not, in the first place, lie in the securing/respect of various moral
principles, but in the opinion of the citizens over whom political power is exercised.
Legitimacy is not achieved by enacting or respecting a set of external moral principles but is
conferred by subjects. This is why Williams does not require an error theory, unlike the
moralists who claim to enumerate the (allegedly) universal moral principles that ground the
state’s moral right to rule.Hence, the primary purpose ofWilliams’ account is not to provide
an alternative (albeit minimal) set of principles that ground a state’s right to rule, but to
enable us to understand the nature of politics itself. Of course, when subjects ask if a state
satisfies the BLD, this is for them a normative question; asWilliams puts it,when we ask what
makes sense to us we think normatively ‘because what (most) makes sense to us is a structure
of authority which we think we should accept’ (Williams, 2005,p.11),but these judgements
do not characterise the timeless conditions of legitimacy.We enjoy a period of stability that
enables us to hold the state to a higher standard of acceptability than has been the case in the
past.Accordingly, judgements about what makes sense will reflect a whole host of variables
that cannot be captured by any specific set of moral ideals, which is why Williams’ account
is purposefully abstract and indeterminate.
Moreover, judgements about the acceptability of the state are not the same as pondering
what a perfectly just society may look like. For Williams, justice, rights and liberty (and so
on) are secondary political issues.8 When we ponder which normative goals we should
pursue ‘now and around here’, we must remember that in many cases this is a question ‘that
belongs to the level of fact, practice and politics, not one that lies beyond these in the very
conditions of legitimacy’ (Williams, 2005, p. 17).This does not preclude us from claiming
that certain features of existent states are objectionable – I may think that the United
Kingdom’s basic structure should be reformed so that it ameliorates the plight of the
disadvantaged,or hold that certain decisions my government makes are morally indefensible
(like the decision to go to war in Iraq) – but such judgements are not always judgements
about legitimacy, even though on occasion they clearly are, because we can and do make
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such claims without thinking that, all things considered, the state is an unacceptable solution
to the first question.9 To this extent,Williams is sensitive to the Hobbesian insight that we
cannot judge the legitimacy of the state solely in light of our own (often deeply idiosyn-
cratic) optimal moral judgements, because no functioning political state could exist if claims
about its legitimacy had to cohere with all citizens’ judgements about the optimal set of
moral principles that should govern political life. Judgements about legitimacy are judge-
ments to the tune that the state is, or is not, a realistically acceptable order of coercion that
can secure the conditions of cooperation among groups of people who have disparate moral
beliefs and conflicting interests.
Defending the BLD
Now that Williams’ account has been outlined we are in a position to assess it. In the
remainder of this article I focus on four lines of critique.The first alleges that the claim that
the state must offer a justification of its power to each subject rests on a moral claim about
the equal worth of persons which precludes Williams from offering a realist theory. The
second criticism contends that he endorses an erroneous ‘consensus’ view of politics.The
third asserts that our judgements about what passes the BLD must reference a set of
normative claims held to be antecedently true to any claim of authority (which prohibits
us from providing a categorical distinction between realism and moralism). The fourth
criticism sees Williams employing an idealistic conception of politics itself. I argue that all
four arguments fail because they mischaracterise the nature of the BLD and the view of
political rule that motivates it.
The Scope of the Basic Legitimation Demand
Matt Sleat argues that Williams’ insistence that the state has to offer a justification of its
power to each subject ‘fall[s] back ... upon some foundational moral premise that all persons
matter’ and that this disqualifies him from articulating a cogent realism, because if we are to
keep ‘political realism and political moralism distinct it has to be the case that it is possible
to fully explicate politics and the necessary conditions of legitimacy without recourse to
external moral conditions’ (Sleat, 2010, p. 495).At certain points this interpretation appears
compelling. Williams (2005, p. 4) writes that a subject is ‘anyone who is in its [the state’s]
power, whom by its own lights it can rightfully coerce’, and that the state must offer a
justification to each subject because if it does not ‘there will be people whom they are
treating merely as enemies in the midst of their citizens, as the ancient Spartiates, consis-
tently, treated the helots whom they had subjugated’ (Williams, 2005, p. 135).To this end,
he claims that,‘at least ideally’, the state must have something to say ‘to each person whom
they constrain’ (Williams, 2005, p. 135).
Yet Sleat misreads Williams’ intention as being to present a rival normative conception
of the content of any successful legitimation, a central aspect of which is the belief that the
state can only be legitimate if it offers a justification to each person for moral reasons.
However, the most internally consistent reading reveals that the scope of the state’s
legitimation story is best understood as being offered to those persons considered to be
citizens or political subjects, rather than simply those who are subjected to the state’s power
on other grounds (like the Helots), the point being that unless the state offers a justification
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to each person they constrain, the relationship between the rulers and those persons
approximates internal warfare, not political authority, because the powerful exercise
unlegitimated coercion. It does not follow that these regimes should thereby be classed
illegitimate (in a binary sense) in the way many moralistic accounts suggest.
If Sleat is right, Williams would have to hold that Sparta was illegitimate because its
treatment of the Helots did not respect the premise of basic moral equality that allegedly
lies at the heart of the BLD.However,Williams explicitly does not suggest that we can judge
Sparta illegitimate for this reason. He explicitly observes that the Helots were considered
alien people, not political subjects, and states that it is only when there ‘is an attempt to
incorporate’ the radically disadvantaged as political subjects that we can conclude that BLD
‘has not been met’ (Williams, 2005, p. 5).This idea of ‘incorporation’, and the subsequent
claim to authority, is centrally important. He writes that:
There can be a case of internal warfare, of the kind invoked in the case of the Helots.There
is no general answer to what are the boundaries of the state, and I suppose that there can in
principle be a spongiform state.While there are no doubt reasons for stopping warfare, these
are not the same reasons, or related to politics in the same way, as reasons given by a claim to
authority. In terms of rights the situation is this: first anyone over whom the state claims
authority has a right to treatment justified by the claim of LEG; second, there is no right to
be a member of a state, if one is not a member ... third, there is no claim of authority over
enemies, including those in the situation of the Helots. In virtue of this last point, such people
do not have a right of the kind mentioned in the first point ... the significant cases for present
problems are those in which the radically disadvantaged are said to be subjects and the state
claims authority over them (Williams, 2005, p. 6).
Once we see the idea of ‘incorporation’ as framing the scope of the BLD we can
distinguish between the citizens (or subjects) to whom a justification of power is offered
(Spartans) and those people who may simply be subjected to coercion (like the Helots) to
whom it is not.Williams is especially clear about this in ‘From Freedom to Liberty:The
Construction of a PoliticalValue’ when he writes that the legitimation story ‘is supposed to
legitimate the arrangement to each citizen, that is to say, to each person from whom the state
expects allegiance; though there may be other people within the state, slaves or captives,
who are nakedly objects of coercion and for whom there is no such legitimation story’
(Williams, 2005, p. 95, emphasis in original).
With this in mind, there is little reason to hold that Williams’ account is premised on the
acceptance of some external moral principle of basic equality, because, as I have intimated,
his basic aim is to delimit the nature of political authority, and the state need not stand in
political relations with all of those persons whom it coerces. For this reason, he need not
(and does not) invoke any necessary claims about the scope of the legitimation story
because, as the quotation from his liberty paper shows, whom the state must justify itself to
depends on those from whom it demands allegiance by incorporating them as political
subjects. There is consequently no pre-political moral standard that determines who the
BLD must be directed to and it is possible that certain groups will be coerced for reasons
that only make sense to the constituency of persons to whom the state seeks to legitimate
itself (i.e. the Spartan citizens rather than the Helots). In such a situation Williams helps us
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to see that political relations exist between the rulers and the subjects to whom their
legitimation story makes sense even if there are other people to whom no justification is
offered.
Williams thus uses a more restrictive conception of whom the state must legitimate itself
to than is alleged by Sleat when he claims that Williams holds it as a necessary requirement
of legitimacy that the BLD apply to all persons due to some tacit moral principle of
equality.When Williams claims that, now and around here, all persons must be treated as
political subjects (in a way the Helots were not), this is for reasons linked to the modern
notion of the state as a legal-rational order. Hence, this is a historical development that
relates to the disenchanted nature of modernity that Williams (following Weber) highlighted
when he noted that traditional hierarchical justifications of inequitable treatment no longer
makes sense.10 He is not claiming that all political orders throughout history should be
judged legitimate or illegitimate according to this standard.
Sleat is motivated in part by Williams’ claim that ‘slavery is imperfectly legitimated
relative to a claim of authority over the slaves: it is a form of internalized warfare, as in the
case of the Helots’ (Williams, 2005, p. 5), but he wrongly infers that Williams holds that all
states containing slaves were for that reason illegitimate. This is the sort of fantastically
unhistorical judgement thatWilliams seeks to avoid.The point of the slavery example is that
slaves are not party to a political relationship, as a form of legitimation is an identifying
category of politics (and they are not offered a legitimation that could make sense to them),
not that all slave states were illegitimate.A state can be legitimate and contain people whom
it does not treat in political terms provided its legitimation story makes sense to ‘a
substantial number of the people’. In certain historical periods treating slaves, like the
Helots, in this way may have made sense to the relevant constituency of citizens, even
though ‘now and around here’ we do not think this.11
We can consequently see that Williams’ account is not parasitic upon an external (moral)
principle of basic equality once we recognise that the legitimation story is offered to each
citizen, because it is the act of claiming authority that generates the need for justification.
The idea is that not doing so would be a performative contradiction of some sort as the
claim to authority – which is intrinsic to politics – implies some account of justification or
explanation. If the state makes no such claim on certain people, by not incorporating them
as citizens, the scope of the BLD is limited to those from whom it demands allegiance.12
The Consensus Critique
Critics also claim that Williams endorses an erroneous consensus view of politics. For
instance, when he claims that LEG + Modernity = Liberalism, his critics allege that he is
blind to the pervasive plurality of judgements about what makes sense now and around
here. Jonathan Floyd (2011, p. 44) argues that there is no ‘pre-existing arrangement to be
found about which forms of political authority are acceptable’, and contends thatWilliams’
account fails because ‘the attempt to identify and then reconcile us to some putatively latent
set of ideals in our local way of life is on a hiding to nothing on account of the very plurality
of ideals which surrounds us’ (Floyd, 2011, p. 47). Michael Freeden makes the same point
when he insists that the idea that a state could make sense to its subjects in the wayWilliams
suggests ensures that the BLD offers an ‘unfeasible return to an ideal-type expectation’
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(Freeden, 2012, p. 6). Likewise, Sleat insists that by ‘grounding his theory in the hope or
actuality of agreement on ... the conditions of legitimacy ... Williams’s theory becomes
vulnerable to exactly the same challenge that other realists have posed to liberalism as a
consensus-based theory’ (Sleat, 2010, p. 500).
However, these complaints trade on various misrepresentations. Sleat insists thatWilliams
holds that judgements about the acceptability of the state will be unanimous when he
writes that, for Williams,‘universal acceptance is a necessary condition of legitimacy’ (Sleat,
2010, p. 496), and this also appears to be Freeden’s complaint.Yet Williams states explicitly
that having ‘something to say to each person’ does not imply that ‘this is something that this
person or group will necessarily accept’ because there may be ‘anarchists, or utterly
unreasonable people, or bandits, or merely enemies’ (Williams, 2005, pp. 135–6). In
consequence, satisfying the BLD ‘does not coincide with this insatiable ideal of many a
political theoretician: universal consent’ (Williams, 2005, p. 136, n. 8).
Who has to be satisfied by the BLD is a good question, and it depends on the circumstances.
Moreover, it is a political question, which depends on political circumstances. Obviously, the
people to be satisfied should include a substantial number of the people: beyond that, they may
include other powers, groups ... young people who need to understand what is happening,
influential critics who need to be persuaded and so forth. If this position seems alarmingly
relativist, it is important, indeed essential ... to reflect that in the end no theorist has any way
of advancing beyond it. He or she may invoke absolute or universal conditions of legitimacy,
which any ‘reasonable’ person should accept; but in doing this, he or she speaks to an audience
in a given situation, who share these conceptions of reasonableness (Williams, 2005, p. 136,
emphasis in original).
Williams is therefore categorically not endorsing a ‘universal acceptance’ view according
to which the legitimacy of the state depends on the unanimous acceptance of the
legitimation story. Rather, if the state makes sense to a sufficient number of people (we
cannot be more precise than that), the situation transcends the conditions of unmediated
coercion in which politics is impossible.To this end, just as there is no timeless pre-political
moral standard that determines to whom the state must try to legitimate itself (as I claimed),
there is also no pre-political moral standard that determines how wide the acceptance of the
legitimation story must be. It is possible and altogether likely that certain people will insist
that the legitimation does not make sense and therefore refuse to recognise their relation to
their rulers as being political in kind.Yet Williams recognises, and his critics forget, that it
is often crude to make a binary distinction about legitimacy, which is why he emphasises
that ‘the considerations that support LEG are scalar’ (Williams, 2005, p. 10).13 In some states
it may be impossible to legitimate power to all and we may have to accept that some people
are simply being subordinated (paramilitary Catholics in the recent past in Northern Ireland
spring to mind).However,Williams helps us to see that politics is still occurring with respect
to those to whom the order can be legitimated.14 Despite the inherently contextualist
nature of judgements about who must be satisfied by the legitimation story, the difference
between situations in which a story is offered and generally accepted, and those in which
the powerful either fail to offer a justification at all or offer one that fails to make sense to
their subjects, should in principle be clear.15 Hence John Horton is right to note that
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Williams does not hold that the claim to political authority is always ‘settled or uncontested’
but rather that ‘all parties that claim a relationship of political authority, rather than one of
mere domination, must recognize the basic legitimation demand as something that needs to
be addressed’ (Horton, 2012, p. 131).
Having disposed of this ‘universal-acceptance’ misreading, we are in a better position to
assess the more charitable variant of the consensus critique. Floyd suggests that although
modernity may rule out some legitimation stories it does not help us choose which ones we
ought to accept; even if ‘modern populations do find the notion of the divine rights of kings
unacceptable [this] does nothing to guide our choices between say, social democracy or
neo-liberalism, luck-egalitarians and libertarians ... and so on and so forth’ (Floyd, 2011, p.
46, emphasis in original). However, by repeating the moralistic mistake of conflating our
judgements about optimal theories of justice with the idea that a state may be an acceptable
solution, this misses the crux of what judgements about legitimacy concern. The appro-
priate criterion of making sense is not ‘Does this capture my favoured conception of
justice?’, but (the inherently political question) ‘Is there an acceptable order of authority
given that I must coexist with other citizens who have conflicting interests and different
moral beliefs?’
With this in mind we can ask if is it fair to rebuke Williams for holding that ‘now and
around here’ liberalism makes sense. It is worth bearing in mind two things when assessing
this accusation: first, the importance of securing order and the conditions of cooperation;
and second, Williams’ capacious description of liberal societies as those that aim ‘to
combine the rule of law with a liberty more extensive than in most earlier societies, a
disposition to toleration, and a commitment to some kinds of equality’ (Williams, 2002, p.
264). Once we do so we ought to be less disposed to object to his claim. For one thing,
throughout the Western world regimes that are loosely designated by the term ‘liberalism’
are alone capable of securing various economic goods, minimising military turmoil and
ensuring that we can hold our political representatives to account.This is not a judgement
about the ideal moral optimality of actually existing liberalism but a claim about the merits
of realistically achievable competing ways of ordering our political institutions. Moreover,
even though some people will deny that liberalism in Williamsian terms makes sense, if
these complaints are to be politically convincing they must offer some reasons for thinking
that viable alternatives exist that will be as good at ensuring order and the conditions of
cooperation here and now. Although we cannot simply declare that this is impossible,
Williams’ view is buttressed by the fact that twentieth-century history shows us that
alternative political creeds have on this score failed spectacularly.16
Once we grasp the force of this point we are in a better position to ask whether social
democrats, neo-liberals and luck-egalitarians – or better, the citizens who endorse the
commitments these theories rationalise – will disagree about the acceptability of the liberal
state because they disagree about its justice optimality. This is clearly much less obvious than
Floyd implies because even if some political philosophers, who link justice and legitimacy
closely, may disagree about the acceptability of actually existing liberal states, it is likely that
this shows us more about the esoteric and other-worldly nature of their disputes than about
the opinion of most citizens. Most of the time most citizens in liberal states seemingly
consider winning a democratic election, respecting the capacious liberal values that
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Williams focuses on and not violating some basic human rights, to be enough to confer
legitimacy regardless of the content of their optimal moral theories of justice, to which their
acquiescence attests.
Therefore, once we accept that Williams is not committed to thinking that every person
(a) has to endorse liberalism as the ideal way to organise political society, or (b) must even
consider it acceptable in the more minimal terms I have been focusing on, we can conclude
that he does not endorse the unrealistic ‘consensus’ view his critics object to as he is merely
committed to the view that liberalism (understood capaciously) will be considered accept-
able by a sufficient number of people.17 Certain groups may think that ‘there is no
legitimate government outside of their own creed, and that the liberal state makes no
legitimate demand on them’ (Williams, 2005, p. 136), but Williams remarks that we often
misrepresent the outlooks of such groups and depict them as consisting entirely of fanatics
(he claims ‘this is a standard move, at the present time, in the demonization of Islam’). In
these situations, we need to utilise a ‘realistic social understanding, a desire for cooperation
if possible, and political intelligence’ (Williams, 2005, p. 137).
One way to avoid unrealistic understandings of what forms of political society people
will find acceptable may be to move in a quasi-Humean direction and hold that judgements
about acceptability are conditioned by our psychological propensities, so that the BLD can
be satisfied if authority is exercised by rulers and acquiesced with by the population. (This
makes sense of the remark that ‘it is obvious that in many states most of the time the
question of legitimate authority can be sufficiently taken for granted for people to get on
with other kinds of political agenda’ – Williams, 2005, p. 62.) If so, the purported problem
about consensus may dissipate. In the Treatise Hume writes that he seeks:
Interest more immediately connected with government, and which may be at once the
original motive to its institution, and the source of our obedience to it.This interest I find to
consist in the security and protection, which we enjoy in political society, and which we can
never attain, when perfectly free and independent. As interest, therefore, is the immediate
sanction of government, the one can have no longer being than the other; and whenever the
civil magistrate carries his oppression so far as to render his authority perfectly intolerable, we
are no longer bound to submit to it.The cause ceases; the effect must cease also (Hume, 1985
[1739], pp. 601–2).
While I do not wish to deny that a thoroughgoing Humean account differs from
Williams’ on various fronts, the thrust of the above is compatible with Williams’ view. For
Williams, the state offers a solution to the first question, which enables us to pursue our
interests. Williams claims (and Hume avers) that if the state ceases to secure the goods
associated with it being a solution to the first question, it will no longer make sense to
obey it. In contrast to what the consensus critics suggest, ‘now and around here’ there is
reason to think that most subjects find the thin sort of liberalism Williams denotes
acceptable in the sense he requires even if they disagree about its optimality.As Philp (2012,
p. 634) notes, ‘while that opinion is not necessarily enthusiastic and positive, and for some
groups is nothing more than a modus vivendi, nonetheless, the centre can and does hold in
many orders, and does so with our collective concurrence (albeit motivated very differ-
ently for different groups)’.
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The BLD and Its Normative Content
Charles Larmore contends that Williams fails to offer an alternative to political moralism.
‘It is not so much the BLD as rather the justification of state power, whatever it may be, in
which satisfying the BLD is meant to consist’, Larmore maintains,
that must express a ‘morality prior to politics’: it has to embody an idea of what constitutes the
just exercise of political order – specifically, an idea of what constitutes the just exercise of
coercive power – and that is not only a moral conception but one whose validity must be
understood as antecedent to the state’s own authority by virtue of serving to ground it
(Larmore, 2013, p. 291).
It is true that judgements about what makes sense are normative, but given thatWilliams
acknowledges this – as I noted, ‘when we get to our own case, the notion “MS” does
become normative, because what (most) MS to us is a structure of authority which we
think we should accept’ (Williams, 2005, p. 11) – Larmore’s suggestion that this somehow
problematises Williams’ conception of the BLD is unwarranted: this does not preclude
Williams from reminding us of (a) the primacy of solving the first question, and (b) the
unique character of life under political authority. Thus even though what makes sense to
us is a normative question, this does not impugn Williams’ attempt to offer an account of
political rule and the ethic internal to it.To this end, Larmore muddles Williams’ attempt
to explain what must be in place for politics, as opposed to war, to be occurring, and the
various normative judgements that we make about what makes sense to us.
This invites the possible second rejoinder to his complaint: namely, that speaking about
the necessity of an antecedent conception of the just exercise of political power does not
capture the nature of the sorts of judgements that actually play a role in judging purported
answers to the first political question.As I have argued, judgements about what makes sense
are far more nuanced than Larmore implies because they must be sensitive to the exigencies
of real-world politics.To this end, the BLD fulfils the relevant criteria of realist as opposed
to moralist political thought by giving ‘greater autonomy to distinctively political thought’
(Williams, 2005, p. 3) and by not conceiving of the ‘basic relation of morality to politics as
being represented by either the enactment or structural model’ (Williams, 2005, p. 8,
emphasis in original).Therefore, even though Williams’ account references various moral/
normative judgements this does not make the BLD a species of the ‘applied moral
philosophy’ approach to political theory that he seeks to confute.
Moreover, the thrust of Larmore’s line of critique neglects Williams’ point that we
should get beyond the idea that moral principles must not only underlie, but also in
some way precede, political practice. This is particularly clear in Williams’ papers on
toleration where he maintains that ‘instead of trying to reach the politics of liberalism
from a moral assumption that concerns toleration [namely, a view of autonomy], we
should consider first the politics of liberalism, including its practices of toleration, and
then ask, what, if any, kinds of moral assumption are related to that’ (Williams, 2005, p.
135). When we do so it is hard to ‘discover any one attitude that underlies liberal
practice’ because toleration requires ‘social virtues such as the desire to cooperate and to
get on peaceably with one’s fellow citizens and a capacity for seeing how things look to
them ... some scepticism, the lack of fanatical conviction on religious issues [and so on]’
THE BASIC LEGITIMATION DEMAND 11
© 2013 The Author. Political Studies published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013
(Williams, 2005, p. 138). This reflects Williams’ belief that when we think about legiti-
mation in realistic terms we should recognise that people come to accept, in a less
reflective manner than philosophers like Larmore acknowledge, certain kinds of arrange-
ments which simply strike them as making sense for numerous reasons that may have
very little to do with considerations of justice, and may indeed have little volitional
quality (as they are in part given to us by history). In this sense Larmore fails to grasp
the centrality of Williams’ contention that in politics, as in much of life, we must remem-
ber the truth of Goethe’s dictum: in the beginning was the deed.
The Unrealism of Williamsian Politics
I now move to the final line of complaint, the suggestion that Williams idealistically
misunderstands politics. Michael Freeden remarks that Williams should not only be
maligned for retaining the (unrealistic) liberal view that political rule should be understood
in ‘terms of trust and cooperation, a theme quite central to Locke’s and Rawls’s versions of
liberalism’, but also for failing to recognise that ‘legitimacy is not necessarily an attribute of
all political arrangements, even if sought after by a large number of political actors and
thinkers’ (Freeden, 2012, pp. 6–7). The worry here is that Williams’ belief that there is
something unique about the nature of political rule, given the peculiarity of its claim to
authority and the concomitant demand for justification, is baseless because countless
examples exist where rulers have routinely disregarded the ‘might is not right’ axiom at the
core of the BLD and have failed to offer a justification of their power that makes sense to
their subjects without failing to be ‘political’ in some sense.
Yet we can recognise this and resist the conclusion that Williams’ account is accordingly
flawed. Mark Philp’s discussion of Nazi Germany – a regime that clearly falls into the
category Freeden invokes – in Political Conduct is demonstrative in this respect. Philp claims
that although it is absurd to deny that the Nazi regime acted politically in so far as it ‘sought
to adapt and extend existing forms of political authority [and] relied on an array of
traditional political institutions and mechanisms to achieve [its] ends’, it is equally hard to
insist that it exercised political authority. For one thing, its actions led ‘to an increasingly
distorted set of political ambitions and an increasingly coercive political regime’ which
ensured that ‘the order retained ... a political form but it was less concerned with securing
its authority as opposed to establishing its domination’ (Philp, 2007, p. 71). Furthermore, the
fact that the most abhorrent policies were carried out in secret shows that ‘the state could
not legitimate its activities and would have forfeited its claim to a right to rule had its
activities been made public’ (Philp, 2007, p. 72). Philp concludes that Nazi Germany was in
effect ‘being run by a cabal within the state – an inner state that had no publicly legitimated
... right to rule’, and that when ‘things move in this direction ... it becomes increasingly
incoherent to describe the relationship between the political order and its victims as
political in character’ (Philp, 2007, pp. 72–3).
This reminder about the peculiar nature of regimes that fail to recognise something
akin to the demands explicated by the BLD help us to see that although, qua Freeden,
numerous malevolent regimes exist that appear to be ‘political’ in some sense – they use
state institutions and so on – the relationship that they have to some of the people whom
they coerce may not be political in kind. Once we accept this there is no reason to think
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that the existence of such regimes impugns Williams’ attempt to delineate some central
features of properly political relationships, as such examples can simply be seen to be
deficient in this respect. Hence it is not problematic that some regimes clearly did (and
do) not exercise legitimacy in Williams’ sense, because when they act in this manner it
is hard to describe the relationship that they have with their subjects as being political
in kind.
To this end, Williams helps us to make sense of the ways in which regimes like Nazi
Germany are not only morally abhorrent but can be said to pervert politics.The point is
that even though political power is coercive not all coercion is political, in much the same
way that even though war might be diplomacy by other means, war is not politics by other
means. Hence the appropriate response to the reminder that some states violate the ‘might
is not right’ axiom is not to conclude that Williams’ account fails because ‘anything goes’
as far as political rule is concerned – which is something Freeden comes dangerously close
to suggesting – but to recognise that such regimes do not exercise political authority.The
very existence of such regimes does not therefore refuteWilliams’ conception of legitimacy
precisely because legitimacy is an evaluative standard which, as such, some coercive orders
will fail to meet.
Conclusion
Throughout this article I have argued that Williams’ critics fail to grasp the force of his
account because they misunderstand the claims about the acceptability of the state at its
heart, as well as the resulting conception of politics, which allows multiple but not infinite
variety about which purported solutions can conceivably make sense as answers to the first
political question.This enables Williams to avoid the dilemma of either over-specifying the
political so as to impose haphazardly a set of liberal norms, or removing all content so that
politics becomes compatible with any kind of coercion. At certain points his critics come
alarmingly close to one or the other and mistakenly suppose that because the BLD has some
normative content this implies some vestige of political moralism. In so doing, they
implicitly affirm the categories of ‘politics as applied morality’ or ‘politics as bare force and
coercion’ that he wants to transcend. I have defended the suggestion that the BLD is a
standard of evaluation derived from the practice of politics, rather than an external moral
standpoint, precisely because it is sensitive to the distinctively political demand for alle-
giance that characterises the relationship between the state and its subjects. Once we accept
this, we should acknowledge that political theory cannot simply be an exercise in applying
a set of principles, derived from an external moral standpoint, to politics. This is a
compelling ‘realism’ because Williams does not deny that normative considerations have a
place in politics but challenges the (typically unquestioned) authority of moral philosophy
by reminding us that if political theory is to contribute to the ongoing task of making sense
of the political situation in which we find ourselves, we must focus on the unique nature
of political allegiance, and address the perennial first question in light of the unique
historical circumstances in which the demand for legitimation arises.
(Accepted: 11 March 2013)
THE BASIC LEGITIMATION DEMAND 13
© 2013 The Author. Political Studies published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2013
About the Author
Edward Hall is a Fellow in Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research
interests lie in contemporary political theory and British political thought since the Second World War. He has
published in Ethical Perspectives, Politics and Res Publica: A Journal of Moral, Legal and Social Philosophy. Edward Hall,
Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London
WC2A 2AE, UK; email: e.hall@lse.ac.uk
Notes
I would like to thank Carlo Argenton, James Gledhill, Kajal Patel, Mark Philp and three anonymous reviewers for Political Studies for
their insightful comments on this article. Countless discussions with Pietro Maffettone and Paul Sagar have greatly improved the final
product (although the usual disclaimers apply) and I am very appreciative of their support. I am especially grateful to Geoff Hawthorn
and Paul Kelly for their continued guidance and encouragement. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the Arts and Humanities
Research Council for funding the doctorate during which this article was written.
1 See Williams, 2005. Raymond Geuss has also been influential. He discusses Williams in Geuss (2005, pp. 219–33) but see Geuss
(2008) for the most general statement of his realism. Stears (2007) and Galston (2010) introduce the realist/moralist debate while
Flathman (2010), Forrester (2012) and Frazer (2010) examineWilliams’ contribution. Other important discussions include Cohen
(2003), Estlund (2008, pp. 263–75), the essays collected in Floyd and Stears (2011) and the edition of the European Journal of Political
Theory dedicated to ‘realism’ (North, 2010).
2 Williams thus endorses a ‘normative’ conception of politics in so far as answering the first question enables us to enjoy the political
goods he associates with so doing.This does not mean that Williams is tacitly a political moralist, because he does not prioritise
a set of pre-political moral norms in the way the enactment and structural models do.The problem with political moralism is not
that it sees politics as a normative enterprise (per se) but that it does not give autonomy to distinctively political thought.
3 Williams does not maintain that citizens must accept a legitimation for the ‘right’ moral reasons, but endorses the idea of a modus
vivendi solution (Williams, 2005, p. 2, n. 1). Regrettably for reasons of space I cannot discuss the CTP further but see Williams
(2002, pp. 225–32) for his fullest account.
4 SeeTsai (2013) for a discussion of the theory of error argument.Realists typically overlook the fact thatWilliams does not consider
Habermas to be a political moralist because he rejects the derivation of legitimacy ‘from the formal properties of the moral law,
or from a Kantian account of the moral person’ by situating his account between facts and norms (Williams, 2005, pp. 9–10).
However, see Williams (2005, pp. 14–7) for a discussion of some of the problems Habermasian views nonetheless face. Regrettably,
a full discussion of the differences between their accounts is beyond the remit of this article.
5 On this it is worth noting the relation with his work on internal reasons (Williams, 1981).
6 Simmons subscribes ‘to political voluntarism as the correct account of these transactional grounds for legitimacy’ and holds that
because ‘no actual states satisfy the requirements of this voluntarism ... no existing states are legitimate’ (Simmons, 1999, p. 769).
Although his distinction between justification and legitimacy makes his view more complex, his account remains unconvincing
because legitimacy ceases to be a meaningful standard of evaluation as no political society has been, or will be, legitimate (it is like
claiming that tallness is morally significant but that all men are short because they are not giants.) This does not accord with our
considered use of the term: after all, it makes sense to hold that, for example,Assad’s Syria is less legitimate than David Cameron’s
Great Britain.
7 This kind of authority is an identifying criterion of politics through history (Williams, 2005, p. 69).
8 Although for an engaging sceptical discussion of the relationship between legitimacy and justice in realism, see Runciman, 2012,
pp. 66–8.
9 For further discussion of this point see Horton, 2012, p. 135.
10 As Freyenhagen notes (2011, p. 13),Williams holds that ‘in the modern world the questions of legitimacy and justification need
to be answered in a way which addresses each citizen’s reason and judgment’.
11 This does not commit Williams to the view that slavery is morally acceptable: ‘crimes against stateless persons are surely crimes,
and Helot-like slavery surely violates rights’ (Williams, 2005, p. 6).
12 It might be thought that my ‘restrictive’ interpretation emphasises the more marginal papers in In the Beginning, at the cost of
‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’.The latter however was initially presented on 23 May 1996 in Cambridge under the
title ‘Moralism and Realism in Liberal Politics’ (see www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/past_hecsems.htm, accessed 11 July 2012) and
remained unpublished in Williams’ lifetime.‘From Freedom to Liberty’ was published in Philosophy and Public Affairs in 2001 (and
is the most polished paper in the collection). Williams may have emphasised the more restrictive interpretation to dispel these
interpretative problems.
13 There is no reason to think that it is easy to make blanket judgements about legitimacy, and doing so will often be a matter of
judgement that may depend on the perspective of the people doing the judging. Consider apartheid South Africa. Most bluntly
we might say that if some white South Africans sincerely endorsed the legitimation story, there is reason to hold that they were
in a political relationship with their rulers. But in regard to the non-white population, for whom the legitimation story did not
make sense, political relations did not hold as they felt that they were merely subordinated. If, as I presume was the case, such people
were not avowedly seen by the rulers to be enemies (like the Helots in Sparta) or slaves (as in ancient Athens) we can cogently
hold that the state was illegitimate because the legitimation story failed to make sense to the vast majority of subjects. Moreover,
as we – unlike the Spartans vis-à-vis the Helots – think (for complicated historical reasons to do with the disenchanted nature of
modernity) that excluding groups for racist reasons does not make sense, as external observers we can conclude that politics is
not occurring between the vast majority of persons and the state because they did not recognise the political authority of their
rulers.
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14 We can develop the thrust of this if we consider how the coercion of those who deny that the legitimation story makes sense could
be part of a strategy that seeks to secure a more wide-ranging legitimacy in the long run. Such coercion is different to the acts
of a state that thinks that it can solve such problems by war or genocide. I am grateful to Mark Philp for stressing the importance
of these implications of Williams’ account.The question of how such people should be treated by the state prior to this remains
and, as a reviewer has observed, this issue is worthy of further discussion in the wider realist literature.
15 Thanks are due to Paul Sagar for discussing this point.
16 Here I am indebted to Paul Sagar’s illuminating discussion in his paper ‘From Scepticism to Liberalism’, which was originally
delivered at the 2012 MANCEPT workshops in political theory. The point, asWilliams notes, is that in many cases various utopian
alternatives to liberalism ‘do not even reach the threshold of offering a serious political consideration’ (Williams, 2005, p. 92). For
a contrasting view of the role of such historical considerations in political argument which misses the importance of such
judgements, see Floyd 2009.
17 Floyd also claims that Williams’ view only makes sense if liberalism is ‘so broad as to radically under-determine our political
options’ (Floyd, 2011, p. 45). But there is no reason to suppose thatWilliams holds that there will be consensus on what is required
by the concrete instantiation of these thin liberal principles, because he never suggests that we can avoid debate and compromise
and insists that we must reflectively consider how much philosophy can determine politically.
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